down load or retyped copy. If there are errors, please e-mail me
and Privacy Commission/Ont. (IPC)
the 2003 FOI Campaign
COMMENTS - About the IPC and its Orders Generally
MO-1519 - My Comments about this Order
MO-1519 & Nature of the Appeal
Past history of requests under the Act
Recent history of requests under the Act
The current request and appeal
MATTERS & The Appellant's Representations
- FRIVOLOUS OR VEXATIOUS
The City's position
The appellant's position
Abuse of the right of access
The following comments
are made under the full protection of all the Rights and Freedoms to free
speech that Canadians have, by way of the Charter and all other supporting
Acts, common law, etc., to express political opinions, political observations
(& of human nature in general) and comment on their government, at
all levels and in whatever form they take, during an election or otherwise.
This should also be considered a victims statement. The following
facts are further reasons why the writer should be entitled to freedom
of expression without persecution; I am a poor writer who can't afford
a secretary or proof-reader (especially with no hope of a lawyer to proof-read),
who is under a heavy workload to try and keep up with paid bureaucrats
and who has out performed City staff for the benefit of the Cawthra Bush
& community in general in the past, that the only way to overcome the
common government tactic of trying to burn out people, groups and their
volunteers who oppose government (plans & actions) is to do the best
I can, as fast as I can and as honestly as I can. And if that is
not good enough for you, then fund the cost to do this work to whatever
standard you can afford!
MO-1519 - General Comments (there are a lot more to come);
There is so much wrong with this
Order that I would be writing a list of its errors, flaws and out-right
falsehoods, at least as long as it is. The time for that is not handy
so I will hit the highlights.
The most single important point is
that 12 letters from the community, taxpayers
and members of the Friends of the Cawthra Bush & Greater Mississauga
Area (FCB) and The Cawthra Ratepayers' and Residents' Association (CRRA),
plus one later on that was misplaced, for a total of 13 letters, noting
how we needed to make FOI requests. That it was our main tool
for trying to save the Cawthra Bush, a Provincially Significant Wetlands
Complex, an Old-growth urban forest which is also home to Jefferson Salamander,
declared by the Canadian government to be a threatened species. Just
to note some of its worthy features. Also included was the cover
letter for a package of petitions, noting that 1,305,
plus had been delivered to the City of MIssissauga. That number
represents only one of our petition or form letter campaigns, total numbers
are much higher.
However, the writer of this Order,
Laurel Cropley, dismisses them all by simply
saying "not relevant to the specific issues on appeal" and issuing another
Order to end my FOI requests for a year, upholding M-947 which is being
used by the City to end the rest of the community access to City records,
imposes far harsher conditions on me and to make things even worse, due
to the poor wording she used the City extended this Order to deny me access
to City staff regarding non-FOI services! Remember that I am the
main spokesperson for the FCB and CRRA and I make the FOI requests as I
know more about City records then just about everyone else. These
have effectively killed our groups by denying us the life blood
of accurate government records to participate in local government decision
making! Was that what the FOI Act was created for?
For Laurel Cropley to say "not relevant"
to this Appeal or consider the consequences of her actions on the community
is what I call an attack on the intent and spirit of the FOI Act.
The main reason I say that is the IPC has noted in a number of its Orders
that special consideration be given to providing record to groups that
service the community, the public interest, groups that disseminate records
to enhance public & Democratic participation as well as access government
records that can relate to the public's safety. All of which apply
here but she did not give proper consideration to that argument.
In terms of public safety, the records
that the City creates about me, as I try and carry out my duties as the
Leader of the FCB & CRRA, get wrongly labelled as just personal records.
I would need access to these records in order to inform other members how
dangerous it is for them to be active in our groups as City staff would
use it false records about me & IPC Orders like this one to justify
further attacks on members/supporters and/or file false reports about who
started it and/or their conduct. The City can
make its slanderous states about me (or other member of our groups),
public by way of IPC Orders. There by doing the City's
political dirty work and low legal liability to itself. It also,
protects politicians from being exposed as those who would allow such things
to happen, despite the evidence.
The voice of
the community begging for mercy is for all intents and purposes
ignored, as was the IPC's own past rulings about the value of grassroots
groups to the community. The City's official story is that I act
alone and the City will not recognize or deal with our groups. This
is a political agenda that is also being carried out by the IPC, as far
as I am concerned. If the IPC had made a serious effort to consider
the existence of the FCB & CRRA, the City's past actions at shutting
us out of the process and how the IPC Order affects us, then how in the
name of the decency and Democracy, that so many Canadians died for, could
they have ever signed Order MO-1519? I am left feeling that
taxpayers letters, like my own submissions, humble as they are, were just
for toilet paper by the IPC.
Laurel Cropley, makes many references
to to the Orders that deal with City computerized filling system, called
but makes no reference to the Canadian
Environmental Law Association submission and their finding
after reviewing the City of Mississauga's statements "We
submit that this claim, on the part of the City, lacks credibility."
Is that because including the evaluation of another lawyer that demonstrated
the City's statements were not factual or believable to a reasonably intelligent
person, it would weaken the position that she, the IPC and the City, had
taken against me, while giving mine legitimacy? I think so.
The hour is late and I need to do
other things, so when you read the rest of this Order just remember this.
If a bureaucratic was to set out to defame a person to the point that community
would turn its back on him, which would serve the politicians political
agenda, would they not write something like this?
Lack of money to buy justice &
respect and nothing else is reason for what is in this Order.
City of Mississauga
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
submitted a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and
of Privacy Act (the Act) to the City of Mississauga (the City)
for access to
his personal information, including records that the City would or could
use to ban him
from City property.
The City refused
access to the requested information in accordance with section 20.1 of
that in its view, the appellant's request was vexatious as contemplated
4(1)(b) of the
appealed this decision.
of the appeal, the appellant indicated that he believed the Freedom of
(the FOIC) is in a conflict of interest in handling both his access
request and this
appeal. The appellant believed the City Clerk would also be in a conflict
if he were to replace the Co-ordinator on this file. In this regard, the
that both the Co-ordinator and the Clerk have threatened legal action
In support of his position in this regard, the appellant provided this
of correspondence relating to matters between him and these two City staff.
also clarified that he is not interested in accessing records which were
provided to him
in response to previous access requests.
could not be effected and this matter proceeded to inquiry. I decided to
from the City initially, and sent it a Notice of Inquiry setting out the
facts and issues
at inquiry. The City submitted representations in response. I subsequently
from the appellant, and attached the non-confidential portions of the
to the copy of the Notice of Inquiry that I sent to him.
Upon receipt of
the Notice of Inquiry, the appellant submitted a series of letters to this
a range of topics including: criticism of the process; asking questions
unrelated to the inquiry process; and seeking information relating to
After being provided with a deadline for the receipt of representations,
submitted extensive representations in response. From that point on, he
send in bits and pieces of information, comments and other "evidence" which
he asks that
I add to the submissions he made.
I find the appellant's
request to be frivolous and vexatious in the circumstances and dismiss
has a long history of dealings with the City, much of it rife with conflict,
respect to general
interaction with City staff and members of Council and in the context of
requests. In order to put the City's decision, and ultimately my findings
order, into perspective,
it is necessary to review this history in some detail, insofar as it
pertains to access
requests under the Act.
history of requests under the Act
In the past, much
of the appellant's contact with the City revolved around issues relating
the Cawthra Woodlot
and the Woodlot Management Program. A number of these previous
culminated in the issuance of Order M-947 in June 1997, wherein former
Fineberg concluded, among other things, that the requests at issue in
were frivolous or vexatious.
In this order,
the former Adjudicator found, in part, that the "nature, frequency and
numerous duplicative requests" constituted a "pattern of conduct" as that
phrase has been
interpreted by this office. She acknowledged that the appellant likely
in the records being requested in those appeals. However, she found that
after these requests began, the appellant's conduct with respect to the
became 'an abuse
of the right of access' …". Further on this point, the former Adjudicator
[t]he rights afforded the public to access under the Act are accompanied
concomitant responsibilities on the part of requesters. One of these
responsibilities is working in tandem with the institution to further the
of the Act. In rare cases, actions on the part of an appellant which
this approach can be said to be an abuse of this process.
In this case, the actions of the appellant in dealing with the City's staff,
its Freedom of Information office and elsewhere, have not exhibited any
attempt to work constructively with the City to resolve his requests, and,
fact, demonstrate the opposite. Despite the City's attempts to accommodate
the appellant, both within and outside the formal processes of the Act,
responded in an uncooperative and harassing manner to those who have
attempted to assist him. In my opinion, this type of conduct on the part
appellant is relevant to a finding that not only are certain requests
vexatious, but also that the requester is abusing the freedom of
processes, and I so find.
The appellant's abuse of the freedom of information process has not been
limited to the request stage, but also extends to this office [the Commissioner's
office]. [emphasis in the original]
former Adjudicator Fineberg dismissed the appeals. In addition, she invoked
under section 43(3) of the Act to impose conditions on the processing
made by the appellant. In particular, the former Adjudicator imposed a
on the number of requests and/or appeals from the appellant that the City
required to process
at any one point in time. The former Adjudicator clarified that the
refers to each part of a request or an appeal, meaning that a three-part
be considered to consist of three transactions. The former Adjudicator
total number of requests/appeals to be processed in one year to five. This
order was to
be in effect for one year and the appellant was permitted to seek a variance
the end of that
time, failing which these terms were to continue in effect from year to
imposed by this order continue in effect from year to year.
at her conclusions in this order, the former Adjudicator set out in
detail the history of the appellant's interactions with the City as well
manner in which
he behaved during the processing of the various appeals with which she
Some of her comments are relevant to the current request or otherwise are
helpful to place
this matter in perspective:
In the ten-month period of March to December 1994, the appellant filed
total of 15 requests with the City, constituting 33% of all requests received
the City pursuant to the Act. The vast majority of the requests
information concerning the Cawthra Woodlot and the Woodlot Management
Program. Another large group of requests seek access to information
concerning the manner in which various City employees, and in particular,
in the Freedom of Information office, are to "deal" with the appellant
requests under the Act. Two parts of one of the requests sought
access to the
wages and expenses of the Mayor and councillors, and the City's deficit.
Although the City opened only 15 files to respond to these requests, many
the requests consisted of several parts. For example, the April 28 request
contained six parts, the May 2 request, five parts, the June 3 request,
parts, the June 20 request, 31 parts and the June 24, 1994 request, 10
In 1995, the appellant filed an additional 18 requests under the Act,
comprising 58% of the City's requests in that year. Once again, the information
requested concerns the Cawthra Woodlot and the Woodlot Management
program, as well as information concerning the manner in which City
employees are to respond to the appellant's requests under the Act and
costs the City has incurred in responding. Each of the February 10 and
November 10, 1995 requests consisted of 14 parts, although, as per its
practice in 1994, the City only opened and counted one request file for
of the requests filed on these dates.
The appellant filed five requests under the Act in 1996. The City
10 parts comprising the August 7 request as being duplicates of previous
requests. The information sought in these 1996 requests again dealt with
Cawthra Woodlot, the manner in which the City was to interact with the
appellant and the City's Active Record Indexing System (ARIS) and Inactive
Record Indexing System (IRIS) records management systems which were
previously the subject of Order M-870.
In addition, in the City's chart setting out the requests that are the
this appeal, 23 parts of the requests are duplicates of requests previously
submitted by the appellant to the City.
The former Adjudicator
also considered other matters which she viewed as being relevant
to the issue,
such as: the appellant's practice of abandoning the request when the fee
requests for records which the City has previously indicated do not exist;
were appealed even though access was granted; and, as is apparent from
the appellant's "attitude" towards the City's employees and the freedom
issued by this office is also relevant to the issues in this appeal.
In this order
concerning an appeal filed by the appellant against the City, Assistant
Tom Mitchinson considered the adequacy of the City's response to the
It appears that this issue had been raised in a number of appeals
the appellant at about the same time and the parties agreed to hold these
appeals in abeyance
pending the Assistant Commissioner's decision in Order M-716. In
the City had adequately responded to the appellant's request, the Assistant
described the format of the appellant's request (noting that this request
followed a similar
format to his other requests):
In the opening paragraph the requester introduces himself, emphasizes the
importance of confidentiality, identifies his preferred method of access,
clarifies that he is primarily interested in working files with handwritten
notes included. This first paragraph closes with the following sentence:
include where the file/record (its location in ARIS or IRIS), is held &
or who looks after the record." These acronyms stand for Active Records
Indexing System and Inactive Records Indexing System, the computerized
records management systems used by the City for all of its record holdings.
The opening paragraph is followed by an outline of the specific information
requester is seeking. This part of the letter is different for each request.
The letter then goes on to stress the importance of processing the request
quickly, identifies the reasons for requesting a fee waiver, and closes
explaining how the requester can be contacted, with particular instructions
to how his phone answering machine should be used.
The basis for
the appellant's appeal was that the City had failed to include reference
where the responsive
records were located on the ARIS or IRIS system. In finding that this
not form a part of the request, Assistant Commissioner Mitchinson stated:
The parts of the City's records management indexing system which were used
to retrieve responsive records and the City employees who are responsible
managing these particular record holdings do not appear on the face of
records and, in my view, the City is not required to create new records
would link these records management codes to the records accessed by the
appellant in order to comply with section 19 of the Act.
In my view, the information contained in the opening paragraph of this
other similar request letters submitted by the appellant relates to the
which the appellant would like to receive the records and falls outside
scope of the substantive access request.
history of requests under the Act
On December 14,
1999, the appellant submitted a three-part request to the City for
to an "event" (an incident involving the appellant) that occurred on October
28, 1999 at the
Cawthra Estate (Request 99-000223). In particular, he asked for:
the names, employee numbers, their rank as well as any other way to clearly
the individual City staff members involved in this event;
a copy of whatever records they filed or created regarding this event;
a copy of all the City by-laws or policies that apply to persons taking
City property (which he asked to be made available for viewing so that
select those portions he wished to have copied).
As a preface to
this request, the appellant specified the manner in which the City is to
respond to his
request, the specific location of the records (including information about
ARIS and IRIS
codes). In this regard, the format of the appellant's request is very similar
by the Assistant Commissioner in Order M-716.
The City responded
initially on December 15, 1999, and subsequently issued a decision on
January 13, 2000,
enclosing an index of records on which it identified that eight records
exist with respect
to part two of the request and indicated that seven of them would be
the appellant. The index identified that the remaining record was denied
pursuant to section
12 (solicitor-client privilege) of the Act.
The City also
indicated that no records exist relating to part one of the request and
for their non-existence. The City indicated further that no records exist
relating to part
three insofar as private individuals are concerned, noting that records
photography are publicly available and can be viewed anytime. The
the appellant that it was waiving the fees associated with processing this
did not appeal this decision.
submitted another similarly worded request on September 15, 2000, this
for an incident
involving him on August 16, 2000 at the Cawthra Estate (Request
The first two parts of this request were virtually identical to those in
as was the preface. In part three of the request, the appellant asked for
to the City by non-City staff.
The City responded
to this request on October 12, 2000, identifying two records
part two of the request. The City granted the appellant partial access
severances made to identifying information relating to staff and participants
pursuant to sections
8(1)(e) (endanger life or safety) and 14 (invasion of privacy).
The City indicated
further that names and other information about staff (in response to part
one of the request)
was being denied under section 8(1)(e). Finally, the City noted that no
exist. As in its previous access decision, the City waived any fees
the processing of this request.
did not appeal this decision.
On October 23,
2000, the appellant submitted a similarly worded three-part request for
to an incident involving him on September 13, 2000 at the Cawthra
(Request 000181-2000). In part three of this request, the appellant
asked for a videotape
of the incident.
On November 17,
2000, the City granted partial access to an incident report and three staff
the personal information of staff withheld pursuant to sections 8(1)(e)
Similar to its
previous decision, the City stated that access was denied to employee names,
and employee ranks pursuant to section 8(1)(e). The City indicated
no other records exist, and in particular, that no videotape exists. Finally,
that it was waiving the fees associated with processing the request.
responded to this decision by requesting that the City provide him with
of the records (as it had done in the past), even though only four records
and all were disclosed to him (in part). He then "required" the City to
to certain identified individuals regarding the videotape.
The City complied
with his request for an index and reiterated its decision that the videotape
does not exist.
The City stated further that it was not able to respond to the appellant's
suggested that he contact the director of Recreation and Parks.
did not appeal this decision.
a week after the City's final response to the previous request, the appellant
request (on December 5, 2000) to the City. In this similarly formatted
000219-2000), the appellant requested that the City conduct a search in
Security Division, for all of his personal information. In making this
stated that it was "a request for a reasonable search for his personal
not one that will present me with an unacceptably large bill for searching".
To be specific,
the appellant indicated that he was seeking all records that "refer to
Moreover, if records were found in more than one file, he expected the
of files and
their titles to be noted. He indicated further that the request was to
how he is to be dealt with. As well, he specified that he was seeking
to the videotape "that recorded the September 13, 2000 event" (even
though the City
had indicated twice that this videotape did not exist and that it had provided
him with all
records relating to the September 13, 2000 incident).
On December 15,
2000, the City wrote to the appellant and explained that its security
not organize records based on names. As a result, the City noted that it
to retrieve records using his name alone. The City indicated that if the
wished to pursue
this request, he should forward a more precise description of the types
may contain information about him, such as particular incidents, locations,
dates, and so
on. The City stated that once the appellant provided this information,
process his request.
A number of written
communications were exchanged between the appellant and the City,
relating to the
City's request for clarification. Essentially, the appellant took issue
manner in which
the City said it maintained its records. As part of his criticism, the
parsed the City's
December 15 letter, commenting on each sentence and requiring the City
to respond to
him to explain "what these sentences mean to you". The appellant set out
how the records should be maintained and stated: "Therefore, I believe
are not being
truthful or factual in your letter".
indicated that he would not change his request, stating, "I direct you
out your responsibilities
under the Act".
In response to
this, the City wrote back on January 12, 2001, to advise the appellant
the Manager of Security Operations, all Incident Reports are filed by month
that there are approximately 700 occurrences filed per month. The City
asked the appellant
again to provide specific dates of occurrences where he is named since
the reports are
not filed by name. The City also indicated at this time that fees were
expected to apply,
depending on the number of months to be searched.
On January 16,
2001, the appellant responded to the City stating that he believed the
him service. He suggested locations where he believed records might exist
based on his
review of the types of records the City maintains (as described in its
of the comments made by the appellant in this letter were re-iterated in
next access request
(the request at issue). In particular, he stated, "please make a point
finding the records
regarding the November 16, 2000 event that involved …".
then "directs" the City to contact him to explain its records system and
clarify his request.
to two of his previous requests (Request 000161-2000 and
the appellant stated:
In my requests I have specifically asked you provide information regarding
records location and you have failed to do so. This is withholding of service
and the Information and Privacy Commission has never specifically ruled
this information is to be denied.
On January 19,
2001, he sent a follow-up letter in which he refers to the January 16 letter
and then suggests
that City staff be contacted and asked if they have any files/records about
him. He indicated
that the City should contact him for further directions in this regard.
also asked that
the City explain its filing methods to him. He concluded that the FOIC
me access" which he believed shows that she is in a conflict of interest.
then sent another letter to the City on January 23, 2001 in which he stated:
I have not received a decision letter yet from you regarding this request.
has been sent then inform me of that fact and send me a copy. I have also
been contacted by you regarding efforts at clarifying my request. I have
repeatedly instructed you to do so and you have not. It is necessary for
do so in order to grant me full access to all the records that I am requesting
and to keep costs down. SO CALL ME! [emphasis in the original]
The City wrote
two letters to the appellant on this same date. In one letter, the City
the file number
which had been assigned to the final request (000219-2000), and stated:
This is in response to your request for access to your personal information
the City's Corporate Security Office and further to your letter of January
2001, wherein you identify a particular record dated November 16, 2000.
A search was conducted of the Corporate Security records and no report
involving you was found for that date.
In the other letter,
the City indicated that it was responding to the appellant's January 19,
this time simply referring back to its January 12 letter.
Finally, on January
29, 2001, the appellant wrote again to the City, indicating that he was
Due to the manner in which you have handled my FOI request, withheld
service, refused to communicate with me in a meaningful and/or professional
fashion and your refusal to discuss my clarifications and/or if it would
by you for a search for records, I am forced by your actions to
current FOI request 000219-2000. [emphasis in the original]
current request and appeal
The current request,
which the appellant sent to the City was dated (on the first page)
January 16, 2001
(but signed and dated on the last page and apparently delivered by the
January 29, 2001). As I noted at the beginning of this order, this request
for access to
records containing the appellant's personal information, including records
the City would
or could use to ban him from City property. In making this request, the
that the lowest cost search method best suited to finding all of the
records was to
be used, but only after speaking to him about the different methods of
were possible. He then suggested how/where to search (in general terms).
Referring to his
previous requests (99-000223, 000161 and 000181) through which he
he indicated that the location of these records/files "is a good place
that "these kinds of records and any other kinds of records that the City
be used to ban me from City property … are the ones I'm seeking" [emphasis
in the original].
In other words, the appellant is seeking records in the City's custody
contain "my personal
information and report about me and my activities." He specified the
which he believes records are likely to be kept. He indicated further that
be conducted in the offices of Corporate Security as he believed that it
this department would have records. He noted that he has been told that
does not permit a search by file content but finds this explanation to
He also asked that the City conduct a search to specifically find records
relating to the
November 16, 2000 incident (referred to in his January 16, 2001 letter).
that the FOIC should contact City staff to see if they have notes/files
to him. Finally,
the appellant requested that the records be grouped by department and that
they be identified
using the Department Code. In this regard, the appellant stated:
The City has methods for identifying the location of its files/records
are noted in the FOI manual, codes for dept., CA.05, etc., so they are
to provide the record of where the source files are located and I wish
record, as a part of this request.
this request, the appellant indicated that the City should submit a fee
to him before
As I noted above,
the City refused access to the requested information in accordance with
of the Act stating that in its view, the appellant's request was vexatious
by section 4(1)(b) of the Act, and the appellant appealed this decision.
THE APPELLANT'S REPRESENTATIONS
submissions raise a number of new issues, including bias with respect to
office (the IPC)
generally, and gender bias based on the fact that I am a woman, and the
of his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
I will address these issues below.
also submitted a number of documents which he believes support his position
on what he considers
to be at issue in this appeal. This documentation includes, but is not
* information relating to the Cawthra Woodlot, much of
which is produced by him
and/or the organizations to which he belongs which he believes demonstrates
City has misled the public and/or how the City is "shutting me out of the
* information which he claims is "evidence" of a political
agenda on the City's part
against him, the organizations he is involved in and/or represents and
their political activism;
* information pertaining to other access requests he has made
to the City as well as to
* information which he believes is "evidence" of political
interference and/or misuse of
the Act by the City and/or its FOIC; and
* letters of support for his access request from other members
of, or those who
support the organizations to which he belongs.
Because of the
volume of information provided by the appellant (much of which, as I
was provided beyond the final date for the receipt of representations),
will simply acknowledge
that this documentation has been received and considered by me.
In my view, the
vast majority of this documentation supports a conclusion that there are,
issues between the appellant and the City, including the FOIC, the Clerk,
Director, the Commissioner of Corporate Services, the City
City Clerk's offices generally, "City staff", the Mayor and Council generally.
While some of
this documentation might be interpreted as evidence relating to the issue
conflict of interest
with respect to the FOIC, it is equally suggestive that, as a result of
there may be no-one left at the City with whom he does not have a
It also appears
that the inclusion of this "evidence" is intended to demonstrate that the
are serious, as are his requests for information, that he speaks for the
as his political activism is concerned, and that his requests are, therefore,
This appeal is
not a test of the seriousness of the issues the appellant is involved in.
the issue to
be determined is whether the appellant's request is frivolous or vexatious
of the current request, bearing in mind the history of the appellant's
with the City.
In my view, the documentary evidence submitted by the appellant does not
pertain to the
matter before me. On this basis, I find that the majority of it is not
issues on appeal.
Even if I were
to conclude that some of this "evidence" is relevant to his allegations
FOIC and the
Clerk are in a conflict of interest, given my decision below, it is not
for me to discuss
the documents submitted by the appellant further.
suggests that he is not able to receive a fair adjudication of the issues
IPC as this office
is biased in favour of government institutions, and in particular, the
He believes further
that the IPC is biased against the poor. In addition, he claims that,
because I am
a woman, I am unable to impartially address the issues concerning him.
With respect to
the IPC, the appellant submits that this office is corrupt and has perverted
the Act into
a form of legalized government censorship. He argues that the IPC supports,
perpetuates institutional abuses of the public. The appellant believes
IPC has turned
government accountability into a "dictatorial weapon against all who would
oppose the government".
As a result, the appellant states:
In the [City's] case, I have seen a Frivolous and Vexatious ruling used
the board by most City staff as their reason for denying a community leader,
submits that because of the previous IPC rulings against him, this office
adjudicator deciding this appeal) cannot "make a complete new ruling (sic)
submits the following as "evidence" in support of a finding of IPC bias:
* the IPC allowed the City's claim to go ahead to adjudication;
* the IPC allowed the City to control the process (presumably
because it "permitted"
the City to claim that the request is frivolous or vexatious);
* the IPC ended mediation against his wishes;
* the IPC has taken and/or accepted "evidence" from the
City which he believes to be
* the IPC withheld part of the City's representations
(pursuant to the sharing of
* the IPC is restricting this appeal to "frivolous or
vexatious" and not looking at what
was requested; and
* the IPC has structured the appeal and inquiry to reinforce
the City's "self-serving
position that I am a trouble-maker".
On a more general
level, the appellant objects to the IPC procedures for the receipt and
sharing of representations,
which he appears to claim is evidence of bias against him.
states further that the IPC has ruled against him in the past because "it
was too poor
to fight back".
As far as his
allegations of gender bias are concerned, the basis for his claim is most
in a letter the appellant wrote to the Commissioner on September 12, 2001:
In my Sept. 9/01 representation and now I do ask that, the IPC
Commissioner hand this Inquiry over to a man, some like [a male former
I do have reason to believe there are gender prejudices affecting the IPC's
decision making. I feel the need to go on the record and say that because
Inquiry involves accusations of abuse, threatening behaviour towards women
and inappropriate behaviour around children. And Order M-947 which was
done by a women and it is totally out to lunch in the statements made,
reasoning used and important evidence ignored. I am not comfortable with
woman handling this Inquiry.
Given the nature of the statements being made by the City design to motive
(sic) women to come to the aid of other women against the big bad
is going after old women and children and the outrageous conduct of Anita
Fineberg, I have serious concerns about prejudice (sic) decision
women in the IPC. [emphasis in the original]
The rules of natural
justice and procedural fairness emphasize the right to an unbiased
in administrative decision-making. Allegations of bias on the part of the
or a particular
adjudicator are, therefore, very serious, and, as a consequence, should
be made lightly
(Robert F. Reid & Hillel David, Administrative Law and Practice
Toronto, 1978), at page 260).
It appears well
settled in law that it is not necessary to provide proof of "actual bias".
Rather, the test
most commonly applied by the courts is whether there exists a "reasonable
of bias" (David Phillip Jones & Anne S. de Villars, Principles of
Law (2nd. ed.), (Carswell: Toronto, 1994) at pp. 361 - 363).
Speaking for the
majority in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
(1999), 174 D.L.R.
(4th) 193 (S.C.C.) on this issue, L'Heureux-Dube J. stated:
The test for reasonable apprehension of bias was set out by de Grandpre
writing in dissent, in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National
Board,  1 S.C.R. 369 at p. 394, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 716:
… the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by
reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the
question and obtaining thereon the required information … that
test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter
realistically and practically - and having thought the matter
through - conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not
that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously,
would not decide fairly."
this issue in Administrative Law in Canada (3rd. ed.), (Butterworth's,
2001)), at page
106, author Sara Blake noted:
There is a presumption that a tribunal member will act fairly and impartially,
the absence of evidence to the contrary. The onus of demonstrating bias
on the person who alleges it … Mere suspicion is not enough …
Taking this one
step further, in my view, the onus is on the appellant (in this case) to
a credible basis
for the allegation.
Insofar as the
appellant's allegations against the IPC are concerned, they relate primarily
the nature of
the governing legislation and the role and operation of the IPC as
by that legislation. Otherwise, they simply reflect his disagreement with
manner in which
this office has dealt with him in the past and the decisions that have
made in his appeals.
In my view, the
appellant's arguments are based on his unreasonable expectations with
respect to the
and its processes. Disagreement with the processes and decisions of
is not a sufficient basis for a finding that the tribunal is biased against
or individual party. Absent any cogent evidence which might support his
claim, I find
that none of his arguments form a basis for a finding of a reasonable
of bias on the part of the IPC, nor would any reasonable person so conclude.
With respect to
the issue of gender bias, the appellant alleges that I am incapable of
the issues in this appeal simply because I am a woman and because
Order M-947 was
decided by a woman. The basis for this argument appears to be that his
(and particularly in this case) involve women and/or children, although
Clerk of the
City, against whom the appellant has also alleged a conflict of interest,
is a man.
Other than making
a bald assertion, the appellant has provided no credible evidence of or
basis for concluding
that there exists a reasonable apprehension of gender bias (or bias
against the poor
for that matter) at this office generally, or in respect of my decision-making.
I do not accept this allegation.
One final point
on this issue merits comment, however. The appellant claims that since
Fineberg's finding that he and his requests were frivolous and vexatious,
the City has,
essentially, used this decision as a basis for denying him service. This
in light of the degree of "service" the appellant has received (as described
above) with respect
to all of the issues in this appeal (stemming back to, at a minimum, his
believes his Charter rights have been infringed as a result of the
Order M-947 and,
more generally, because he has been denied access to the City's
it is not entirely clear, it appears that he is arguing that the application
and vexatious provisions of the Act is a violation of his Charter
The basis for
his claim is the importance of access to government information in supporting
general and Charter rights in particular.
I agree that access
to government information is fundamental to the exercise of democratic
rights. The creation
of this legislation reflects the importance of the principles of government
and the effective participation of the public in government decision-making.
as indicated in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fineberg (1994), 19
(3d) 197 (Div.
Ct.) at p. 204, "… it is not possible to proclaim that s. 2(b) [freedom
a general constitutional right of access to all information under the control
Similarly, I am not persuaded that there is any Charter-based entitlement
to submit frivolous
or vexatious requests under the Act. Although the appellant has
on this issue, I find that he has failed to demonstrate that the
the provision in section 4(1)(b) of the Act constitutes a violation
FRIVOLOUS OR VEXATIOUS
that I must consider to determine whether the appellant's request is frivolous
are in sections 4(1)(b) and 20.1(1) of the Act and section 5.1 of
823 made under
of the Act specifies that every person has a right of access to
a record or
part of a record
in the custody or under the control of an institution unless the head of
of the opinion on reasonable grounds that the request for access is frivolous
onus of establishing that an access request falls within these categories
with the institution
and (b) of the Act go on to indicate that a head who refuses to
access to a record
because the request is frivolous or vexatious must state this position
his or her decision
letter and provide reasons to support the opinion.
and (b) of Regulation 823 provide some guidelines for determining whether
a request is
frivolous or vexatious. They prescribe that a head shall conclude that
for a record
or personal information is frivolous or vexatious if:
(a) the head is of the opinion on reasonable grounds
that the request is part of
a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access or
interfere with the operations of the institution; or
(b) the head is of the opinion on reasonable grounds that the
request is made
in bad faith or for a purpose other than to obtain access.
In Order M-850,
Assistant Commissioner Mitchinson observed that these legislative
a significant discretionary power on institutions which can have serious
on the ability of a requester to obtain information under the Act",
and that this
not be exercised lightly.
its onus in this case, the City has submitted background information relating
requests submitted by the appellant (as described under the heading "Recent
history of requests").
reiterates his objection to the IPC proceeding with this inquiry on the
the City's claim.
He also submits that the City has not met its onus in establishing that
request is frivolous
suggest that he is at a disadvantage both in requesting information under
and in responding to the issues at inquiry because he is neither a lawyer
in Freedom of
Information matters. His representations appear to imply that he is unsure
what is required
in this process and that the City has been less than helpful in assisting
overall suggest that he is frustrated with the City's "attitude" toward
and its attempts
to obstruct his pursuit of information. In response to the Notice of Inquiry
and the City's
representations, the appellant concludes:
[The FOIC] was abusing the FOI process by endlessly delaying granting
access while seeking clarifications to my request, which also meant she
avoid writing a decision letter. Before I ended my FOI request I consulted
others and discovered the facts. As the IPC has (wrongfully), placed limits
my FOI requests, such that I can't make requests while one is being appealed
it is only reasonable to appeal only FOI requests that completely express
request and will grant access to all City records. The IPC has been made
aware that the City was a hostile institution before it made its F&V
this is the abuses of the IPC's F&V ruling, it has become a weapon.
is only happening as [the FOIC] refuses reasonable service and it is clear
request for personal information will go to appeal. These letters show
that it is
the City that is the bully in this case, the abuser of the process and
that I am
Conduct that Amounts to an Abuse of the Right of Access or would interfere
with the operations of the institution
To determine whether
the criteria outlined in section 5.1(a) are established, I must first
the appellant's filing of the current request, by itself or in conjunction
request, forms part of a "pattern of conduct". If I find that it does,
then I must
whether this pattern amounts to an abuse of the right of access, or (2)
pattern would interfere with the operations of the City.
In Order M-850,
Assistant Commissioner Mitchinson defined the term "pattern of
stated that, for such a pattern to exist, one must find "recurring incidents
related or similar
on the part of the requester (or with which the requester is
some material way)". He also pointed out that, in determining whether a
pattern of conduct
has been established, the time over which the behaviour occurs is a
Further, in Order P-1534, he determined that a distinction must be
formal requests for access under the Act and informal contact
member of the
public and an institution outside the formal context of the Act.
I agree with
and adopt them for the purposes of this appeal.
In Order M-947,
former Adjudicator Fineberg considered whether the appellant's 14
to the institution over an 11-month period constituted a "pattern of
that case, the appellant had submitted numerous previous requests. In
the City had established a pattern of conduct in the circumstances of that
appeal, the former
Adjudicator noted that "the fact that previous requests may overlap with
each other will
not, on its own, establish that these requests are part of such
the original). She concluded, however, that:
What is most striking about the pattern of these requests is that the City
identified each of the ten parts comprising the August 7 request alone
duplicates of previous requests. In addition, two parts of the November
1995 request duplicate previous requests, and two are duplicated within
one request. Because of the duplication in the August 7 request, I have
concluded that, by themselves, these fourteen requests constitute "recurring
incidents of related or similar requests" and, hence, a pattern of conduct
the purposes of section 5.1(a) of the Regulation.
behaviour, or a previous finding that the appellant's conduct constituted
"pattern of conduct"
are not determinative in establishing that the circumstances surrounding
the current request
should be similarly characterized, they are relevant in assessing this
in another case, I might be disinclined to find that two similarly worded,
would be sufficient to establish a "pattern of conduct" (see, for
MO-1488). Where, however, an appellant has clearly demonstrated a
"pattern of conduct"
in the past, and the circumstances of a current request parallel that
pattern, I am
inclined to interpret them as a resurgence of that previous "pattern of
if not a continuation
Taken alone, or
even grouped together, the appellant's first three requests (beginning
do not constitute such a pattern. However, in submitting his December 5,
the appellant embarked upon a return to his previous conduct in his manner
information from the City, not only by revisiting previously requested
also in the manner in which he pursued his request. By unilaterally
December 5, 2000 request and essentially resubmitting it on the same date,
has, in my view, engaged in a "pattern of conduct" as that term has been
defined by this
of the right of access
The meaning of
"abuse of the right of access" was also discussed by Assistant
Mitchinson in Order M-850. He commented on this phrase as follows:
In determining what constitutes "an abuse of the right of access", I feel
criteria established by Commissioner Tom Wright in Order M-618 [decided
before the "frivolous or vexatious" amendments were added to the Act
and Restructuring Act, 1996] are a valuable starting point.
Commissioner Wright found that the appellant in that case (who is not the
same person as the appellant in this case) was abusing processes established
under the Act.
The Commissioner described in detail the factual basis for the finding
appellant had engaged in a course of conduct which constituted an abuse
process. The Commissioner found that an excessive volume of requests and
appeals, combined with four other factors, justified a conclusion that
appellant in that case had abused the access process. The four other factors
1. the varied nature and broad scope of the requests;
2. the appearance that they were submitted for
their "nuisance" value;
3. increased requests and appeals following the
initiation of court proceedings by the
4. the requester's working in concert with another
requester whose publicly stated aim is to
harass government and to break or burden the system.
Another source of assistance for interpreting the words "abuse of the right
access" is the case law dealing with the term "abuse of process".
To summarize, the abuse of process cases provide several examples of the
meaning of "abuse" in the legal context, including:
* proceedings instituted without any reasonable ground;
* proceedings whose purpose is not legitimate, but is
rather designed to harass, or to
accomplish some other objective unrelated to the process being used;
* situations where a process is used more than once,
for the purpose of revisiting an
issue which has been previously addressed.
In my view, although this is not intended to be an exhaustive list, these
examples of the type of conduct which would amount to "an abuse of the
of access" for the purposes of section 5.1(a).
In Order M-864,
Assistant Commissioner Irwin Glasberg summarized the interpretations of
"abuse of the
right of access" in Orders M-618 and M-850 as follows:
Following my review of these two orders, and taking into account the wording
of section 5.1(a) of the regulations, I believe that there are a number
that are relevant in deciding whether a pattern of conduct amounts to an
of the right of access. Some of these considerations are listed below:
(1) The actual number of requests filed
(Are they considered excessive by reasonable standards?)
(2) The nature and scope of the requests
(For example, are they excessively broad and varied in scope or unusually
detailed? Alternatively, are the requests repetitive in character or are
to revisit an issue which has previously been addressed?)
(3) The purpose of the requests
(For example (a) have they been submitted for their "nuisance" value, (b)
they made without reasonable or legitimate grounds, and/or (c) are they
intended to accomplish some objective unrelated to the access process?)
(4) The sequencing of requests
(Do the volume of requests or appeals increase following the initiation
proceedings by the institution or the occurrence of some other related
(5) The intent of the requester
(Is the requester's aim is to harass government or to break or burden the
While this list is not intended to be exhaustive, these factors represent
of considerations which could define "an abuse of the right of access"
purposes of section 5.1(a). I would also reiterate the view, originally
expressed by Commissioner Wright in Order M-618, that a high volume of
requests alone would not necessarily amount to an abuse of process.
of this office have found that the abuse of the right of access described
refers only to the access process under the Act, and is not
in other forums (Orders M-906, M-1066, M-1071 and P-1534).
I adopt the analyses
put forward by these orders for the purposes of the present appeal.
the "legitimacy" of the appellant's purpose in making access requests,
Fineberg found in Order M-947, that the appellant's purpose changed
in focus over
time, thus becoming an abuse of the right of access:
In my view, when the appellant initially began requesting information from
City, particularly concerning the Cawthra Woodlot and the Woodlot
Management Program, he could very well have been said to have had a
legitimate interest in the records being requested. I would note however,
despite the fact that he has suggested that there is a public interest
his requests, he has never provided any evidence of the legitimate uses
which he has put the information to which he has received access. Nor has
provided any evidence of the community and/or environmental groups which
he maintains are interested in the information he receives. It is my view
very shortly after these requests began, the appellant's conduct with respect
the City became "an abuse of the right of access" for the following reasons.
The apparent purpose of the requests changed their focus from reasonable
legitimate grounds to one which may be characterized as seeking to
accomplish some objective unrelated to the access process. For example,
requester became focused on seeking information related to how the City
dealt with his requests and the amount of time and money the City had spent
dealing with him. Because the appellant did not feel he was receiving the
"service" from the City's Freedom of Information branch to which he felt
was entitled, he began using the Act and the freedom of information
as a means to express his personal attacks on the personnel involved in
process. To this end, his requests became a "springboard" for launching
attacks on City council members and the City legal department.
Although the appellant now explains why he pursued requests where the City
had previously indicated that no responsive records existed, I find that
explanation comes rather late in the day and lacks credibility. As I have
at no time during the request and appeals process involving these issues
the appellant raise this point. I can think of no other explanation, nor
appellant offered a credible one, as to why he would pursue these particular
cases unless it was for their "nuisance" value or to harass the City. Neither
these objectives support the use of the process for a legitimate purpose.
The same holds true with respect to those appeals involving fees. Under
the appellant is entitled to dispute the amount of fees charged for access
to information, as well as appealing the City's decision not to waive the
as in the case of Order M-509, the City's position is upheld, again the
appellant has the right to decline to pay the fees. However, in my view,
legitimate positions under the Act become an abuse of the right
when access is requested to the same records a second time.
In addition, the appellant has repeatedly appealed decisions of the City
which he was provided access to the records to which he was seeking access.
An example of this conduct relates to the ARIS/IRIS appeals in which the
issue was addressed by Order M-716. The appellant continued to pursue
appeals in which the same matter considered in that order was the only
dispute. Again, I can think of no legitimate purpose, nor has the appellant
offered one, for this exercise.
In my view, taking the evidence as a whole, the City has provided me with
sufficient evidence to establish that there are reasonable grounds for
to consider the appellant's requests as part of a pattern of conduct that
amounts to an abuse of the right of access.
As I indicated
above, the appellant clearly has issues with the City. In my view, his
in the manner in which he approaches the freedom of information process
indicate an intention
to use this process to further his dispute with the City.
Similar to the
conclusions reached by former Adjudicator Fineberg in Order M-947, I find
that the appellant
has not made any effort to work constructively with the City to resolve
particular, although I do not doubt that the appellant has an interest
requested, in submitting his December 5, 2000 request, he began what can
only be characterized
as an escalation of the "uncooperative and harassing manner" he
The series of letters exchanged between him and the City
his refusal to work constructively with the City to resolve his request.
only did he attempt
to bait and badger the FOIC, his correspondence reflected the
contempt he had
previously shown towards City staff and the freedom of information
While the City
has made genuine efforts to accommodate the appellant, he has responded
uncompromising demands, criticism and belligerence. This behaviour
not only towards the City, but throughout the inquiry process.
Given the appellant's
experience with the Act and this office, I do not accept his suggestion
that his behaviour
is a result of confusion or inexperience with the Act. Although
that he is frustrated,
in my view, it is more likely a result of his own unreasonable
and the thwarting of his attempts to control the process.
Based on the documentary
and other evidence described above, I am convinced that the
approaches he takes with respect to his requests and appeals is by design.
In contrast to
working constructively in pursuit of his objectives, the appellant seeks
control the processes
for responding to and resolving freedom of information matters, and
he demands almost
unlimited attention of any party who approaches him or whom he deems
to contact, be it City representative or a representative of the IPC.
Taken as a whole,
I find that the evidence supports a conclusion that the appellant's request
is part of a
pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access, and
that is my
The question remains,
how should this abuse of the processes of the Act be remedied? It
that the appellant has not learned from his previous experience. In my
view, it is questionable
whether he will amend his behaviour in the future. In a recent
example, Assistant Commissioner Mitchinson dealt with the length to which
is prepared to go to circumvent the restrictions imposed on him in Order
MO-1497). The simple answer might be to prohibit the appellant from using
of the Act. However, at this point in time, a prohibition against
exercise of his
statutory rights for all time would be too extreme. Nevertheless, I think
impose serious restrictions on the means by which the appellant exercises
As a result of
Order M-947, the City is only required to process one transaction at a
both requests and appeals) and a total of five transactions in any year.
this to be a
reasonable limit on the appellant's right of access and, therefore, will
imposed by former Adjudicator Fineberg.
In addition, pursuant
to section 43(3) of the Act, in the order provisions below, I will
on the manner in which the appellant may interact with the City with
respect to his
access requests and appeals of the City's decisions.
As I noted above,
the appellant believes that both the FOIC and the Clerk are in a conflict
of interest in
dealing with his access requests and appeals because they have threatened
against him. This matter arose in relation to certain public statements
made about them.
I have decided,
for reasons outlined below, that I need not address this issue in this
of the Act provides that a person who makes a request for information
may appeal any decision of a head to the Commissioner. Pursuant to section
includes a decision by the head that the request is frivolous or vexatious.
of this office have determined that the Commissioner or her delegate has
power to review all matters pertaining to the decision of a head (see,
M-315, M-449, M-1044, P-158, P-540 and P-1115). The basis for this
succinctly stated by Adjudicator Donald Hale in Order P-1115 (in the context
questions of bias):
Inherent in the powers granted to the Commissioner, as well as his delegates,
is the power to determine questions of bias. The Commissioner's office,
capacity as an administrative tribunal with certain legislative functions,
required to ensure that the rules of natural justice govern the access
information regime in Ontario. As such, I find that I am acting within
jurisdiction in reviewing and making a determination as to an allegation
on the part of a decision maker under the Act.
am satisfied that I have the power to consider the issue of an alleged
of interest at
the request stage. In the circumstances of this case, however, I have concluded
that it is not
necessary or appropriate for me to do so because the Commissioner's power
the access process provides a suitable remedy.
role over the processes and application of the Act generally has been
previous orders of this office (Orders 164, 207, P-345, P-373, P-537,
P-1575, M-618, M-849, MO-1053 and MO-1353-I, for example). In
former Commissioner Tom Wright considered his jurisdiction to entertain
claim that the
appellant's request in that case was frivolous or vexatious in the absence
Order M-618 was decided prior to the amendment to the Act, which
resulted in the
inclusion of sections 4(1) and 20.1, but his comments continue to have
the Commissioner's supervisory role generally. He stated:
The Legislature created the Office of the Information and Privacy
Commissioner to administer the Act in ways that facilitate the purposes
legislation. This mandate cannot require the Commissioner to act unreasonably
in administering his own processes, or in supervising the processes of
institutions. The Legislature must have intended that the Commissioner
the necessary authority to control his own processes, and to supervise
processes of institutions under the Act, so as to minimize or eliminate
potential for abuse.
I have been referred to ample and persuasive legal authority for the
proposition that, as an administrative tribunal exercising quasi-judicial
functions, the Commissioner is "master of his own process". On this basis
believe that I have the necessary authority to control what I identify
of that process which would frustrate the intent of the Legislature in
both a freedom of information regime and an office for its administration.
Speaking to the
question of whether his jurisdiction to control his own processes extends
an ability to
supervise the processes of institutions faced with abuse of process at
former Commissioner Wright concluded:
If I were to accept [the appellant's] submission that I am powerless to
the abuse which I have identified, and that I must mechanically require
institutions and my office to be the subjects of that abuse, I would not
fulfilling the objectives of the legislation, but frustrating them. Notwithstanding
the absence of express powers vested in the Commissioner for dealing with
abuse of process, I am not prepared to serve as agent for [the appellant's]
abuse by perpetuating meaningless exercises in the expenditure of government
resources merely to satisfy [the appellant's] curiosity, or to permit him
the system or render it dysfunctional. This would offend public policy
bring the administration of Ontario's freedom of information legislation
I agree fully
with these conclusions and find that they are particularly germane where
are in conflict.
It is predictable that a claim that a request is frivolous or vexatious
where relations between a requester and institution are strained or otherwise
The inherent supervisory function of the IPC in these cases ensures that
(in respect of the behaviour of both parties) are taken into
account in deciding
whether to uphold such a claim (see, for example, Order MO-1488).
this inherent supervisory role over the processes of this office and institutions
alike, I have
independently reviewed the circumstances surrounding this appeal, as
based on the documentary evidence alone. In particular, I decided that
was not necessary
to consider any argument made by the City on the question of whether
request was frivolous or vexatious.
As discussed above,
I have reviewed the circumstances under which the appellant
request, his behaviour throughout both the request and appeal stages and
in dealings with the City. Based on my own assessment of these
I have concluded that his request is frivolous or vexatious. In my view,
in the manner in which he has and is approaching the freedom of
constitutes a clear abuse of the right of access. I find that to permit
him to continue
his pattern of harassment and belligerence would so offend public policy
that I will,
pursuant to the Commissioner's inherent supervisory authority under the
remedy this abuse,
regardless of anything that may have occurred at the request stage.
Because of my
ultimate findings with respect to the primary issue, I have decided that
to address the appellant's claim that the FOIC and Clerk are in a conflict
Finally, it is
noteworthy in the overall context of this appeal that any conflict arising
and either of these other parties was generated by the appellant's behaviour
and towards City staff and council members generally. There may well come
a time, if it
has not already arrived, that there will be nobody at the City who the
be capable of dealing with him.
1. I uphold the City's decision that the appellant's
request is frivolous or vexatious.
2. I confirm the conditions imposed by former Adjudicator
Anita Fineberg in Order
3. I impose the following additional conditions on the
manner in which the appellant's
requests are to be processed.
* the appellant is to specify the exact information or
records he is seeking, if
possible, the location in which he expects the requested records to be
any other information he believes may assist in locating responsive records;
* the appellant is not to otherwise contact the City
(verbally or in writing) with
respect to the processing of a particular access request and/or appeal,
unless the City contacts him first for clarification of his request;
* the City is not required to respond to any communications
from the appellant unless
it is in response to a properly filed access request (in accordance with
of Order M-947) or it is in direct response to a request by the FOIC for
clarification from him;
* if the appellant does not respond to a request by the
City for clarification by
providing the clarification requested within a reasonable time frame as
the City, the City may close his file as being abandoned. In this case,
the City is
to send the appellant a letter stating that the file has been closed.
* the appellant may appeal the City's decision to close
the file to the IPC;
* the appellant may appeal any other decision of the
head to this office.
4. The appellant and/or the City may
apply to this office at any time after one year has
expired from the date of this Order, to seek to vary the terms of paragraphs
2 and 3,
failing which the terms shall continue in effect indefinitely.
5. This office remains seized of this matter
for whatever period is necessary to
ensure implementation of, and compliance with the terms of this order.
Original signed by: Laurel Cropley,
Adjudicator February 28, 2002
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